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Abstract. We explore the origins of blockchain technologies to better understand the enduring 
needs they address. We identify the five key elements of a blockchain, show embodiments of 
these elements, and examine how these elements come together to yield important properties 
in selected systems. To facilitate comparing the many variations of blockchains, we also 
describe the four crucial roles of blockchain participants common to all blockchains. Our 
historical exploration highlights the 1979 work of David Chaum whose vault system embodies 
many of the elements of blockchains. 
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1.   Introduction 
With a myriad of blockchain distributed ledger systems in existence, over 550 associated patent 
applications under review, and much associated hype, it can be difficult to make sense of these 
systems, their properties, and how they compare. Through exploring the origins of these 
technologies, including David Chaum's 1979 vault system, we provide insights and a clear and 
useful way to think about blockchains. Our historical perspective distills important ideas, 
identifies enduring needs, and shows how changing technologies can satisfy those needs. This 
perspective will help people understand where blockchains came from, whether they are 
important, and if they will persist. 
2.   Elements of Blockchain 
Blockchains provide a mechanism through which mutually distrustful remote parties (nodes) can 
reach consensus on the state of a ledger of information. To trace the origins of these 
technologies, we start by identifying their essential elements informally. A blockchain is a 
distributed ledger comprising blocks (records) of information, including information about 
transactions between two or more parties. The blocks are cryptographically linked to create an 
immutable ledger. Nodes may append information to the ledger through invoking transactions. 
An access policy determines who may read the information. A control policy determines who 
may participate in the evolution of the blockchain and how new blocks may be potentially 
appended to the blockchain. A consensus policy determines which state of the blockchain is 
valid, resolving disputes should conflicting possible continuations appear. 
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As explained by Cachin and Vukolic [CaV17], a range of control policies is possible, including 
permissioned, consortium, private, and permissionless blockchains. In a permissioned 
blockchain, a body identifies and controls who may update state and issue transactions. A 
private blockchain is a permissioned blockchain controlled by one organization; a consortium 
blockchain is a permissioned blockchain involving a group of organizations. In a permissionless 
blockchain, anyone may potentially append new blocks, with the consensus policy (e.g., a 
majority of participants) determining which continuation is valid. Blockchains achieve consensus 
and control (and, in particular, prevent double spending) in part through applying protocols and 
establishing high costs (both economic and computational) to modify the ledger. Typically, 
permissioned systems run faster than permissionless systems because their control and 
consensus strategies depend on faster fault-tolerant protocols [LSP82, Lam84] rather than on 
time-consuming cryptographic proofs-of-work, and they usually involve fewer nodes. Gencer, et 
al. [GBE18] show that permissionless blockchains (such as Bitcoin and Ethereum) are much 
more centralized than many people assume: 20 mining pools control 90% of the computing 
power. 
 
Some blockchains additionally support the idea of “smart contracts,” which execute terms of 
agreements between parties, possibly without human intervention. These agreements might be 
embodied as arbitrary computer programs including conditional statements. 
3.   Embodiments of the Elements 
Although the seminal paper on Bitcoin appeared in 2008 (with the mysterious author Satoshi 
Nakamoto [Nak08]), most of the underlying technological ideas had arisen many years earlier. 
  
A blockchain is a type of distributed database, an idea that goes back to at least the 1970s (e.g., 
SDD-1 [Won77]). 
  
More generally, the idea of record keeping goes back millennia, including to ancient 
Mesotopamia [Kei63]. Kanare [Kan85] describes proper methods for scientific logging, including 
the idea of preserving all transaction records including the history of any modifications to the 
collected data—ideas that are found in many systems (e.g., Hyperledger Fabric). 
  
The idea of immutably chaining blocks of information with a cryptographic hash function 
appears in the 1979 dissertation of Ralph Merkle [Mer79] at Stanford, in which Merkle explains 
how information can be linked in a tree structure now known as a Merkle hash tree. A linear 
chain is a special case of a tree, and a tree provides a more efficient way of chaining 
information than does a linear chain. Subsequently in 1990, Haber and Stornetta [HaS90] 
applied these ideas to time-stamp documents, in 1994 creating the company Surety. These 
prior works, however, do not include other elements and techniques of blockchain. 
  
To prevent an adversary from unduly influencing the consensus process, many permissionless 
systems require that new blocks include a “proof of (computational) work.” Nakamoto’s paper 
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cites Back’s [Bac02] 2002 effective construction from Hashcash. In 1992, Dwork and Naor 
[DwN92] proposed proof-of-computation to combat junk mail. The idea and a construction 
underlying proof-of-work (PoW), however, may be seen in an initial form in 1974 in Merkle’s 
Puzzles [Mer78], which Merkle proposed to implement public-key cryptography. Bitcoin was the 
first to use PoW for both mining and achieving consensus. 
  
PoW aims in part to defend against Sybil attacks [Vuk15], in which an adversary attempts to 
forge multiple identities and to use these forged identities to influence the consensus process 
[Dou02]. With PoW, however, a node's influence on the consensus process is proportional to its 
computational power: forging multiple identities that share the adversary's given computational 
power does not help. To adapt to varying amounts of available computational resources, PoW 
systems dynamically throttle the difficulty of the PoW problem to achieve a certain target rate at 
which the problems are solved [ODM14]. 
  
Permissioned blockchains can be modelled using the concept of (Byzantine fault-tolerant (BFT)) 
state machine replication, a notion proposed in 1978 by Lamport [Lam78], and later concisely 
formalized by Schneider [Sch90]. State machine replication specifies what are the transactions 
and in what order they are processed, even in the presence of (Byzantine) faults and unreliable 
communications [LSP82]. Thereby, to achieve a strong form of transaction consensus, many 
permissioned systems build on the ideas from the 1998 Paxos protocol of Lamport [Lam98] 
(which deals only with crash failures) and from the more practical 2002 PBFT protocol of Castro 
and Liskov [CaL02]. Nakamoto [Nak08a] observed that the permissionless Bitcoin system 
realizes Byzantine agreement in open networks. 
  
Arguably, many of the elements of blockchains are embodied in David Chaum’s 1979 vault 
system [Cha79], described in his 1982 dissertation [Cha82] at Berkeley, including detailed 
specifications. Chaum describes the design of a distributed computer system that can be 
established, maintained, and trusted by mutually suspicious groups. It is a public record-keeping 
system with group membership consistency and private transaction computations that protects 
individual privacy through physical security. The building blocks of this system include 
physically-secure “vaults,” existing cryptographic primitives (symmetric and asymmetric 
encryption, cryptographic hash functions, digital signatures), and a new primitive introduced by 
Chaum—threshold secret sharing [Cha79]. Chaum’s 1982 work went largely unnoticed 
apparently because he never made any effort to publish it in a conference or journal, instead 
pursing different approaches to achieving individual privacy [Cha92]. 
 
In Chaum’s system, each vault signs, records, and broadcasts each transaction it processes. 
“Because the aggregate includes COMPRESSED_HISTORY, the [cryptographic] checksum is 
actually `chained’ through the entire history of consensus states.” [Cha82, p. 92]. “Nodes 
remember and will provide all messages they have output—each vault saves all it has signed, 
up to some limit, and will supply any saved thing on request; only dead vaults can cause loss of 
recently signed things.” [Cha82, p. 109]. Chaum’s system embodies a mechanism for achieving 
membership consistency:  “Among other things, the algorithms must provide a kind of 
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synchronization and agreement among nodes about allowing new nodes into the network, 
removing nodes from the network, and the status of nodes once in the network.” [Cha82, p. 38].  
It also embodies a weak form of transaction consensus, albeit vaguely described and apparently 
not supporting concurrent client requests: “If the output of one particular processor module is 
used as the output for the entire vault, the other processors must be able to compare their 
output to its output, and have time to stop the output on its way through the isolation devices, 
….” [Cha82, p. 38]. The consensus algorithm involves majority vote of nodes based on 
observed signed messages entering and leaving vaults. 
 
Chaum created his vaults system before the emergence of the terms "permissioned" and 
"permissionless" blockchains, and his system does not neatly fall into either of these discrete 
categories. In Chaum’s system, each node identifies itself uniquely by posting a public key, 
authenticated by Level 2 trustees. For this reason, some people may consider Chaum’s system 
a permissioned blockchain. This narrow view, however, diminishes the fact that each node can 
be authorized in a public ceremony independently from any trustee. During this ceremony, 
vaults are assembled from bins of parts, which the public (not necessarily nodes) can inspect 
and test---a procedure that inspired Chaum to coin the more limited phrase "cut-and-choose."  
Regardless of whether one views some configurations of Chaum's vaults as permissionless 
systems, the trust bestowed through the public ceremony creates a system whose trust model is 
the antithesis of that for a private (permissioned) blockchain. For these reasons, we consider 
Chaum's system "publicly permissioned." 
   
Chaum assumes essentially a “best effort” broadcast model and did not provide mechanisms for 
achieving consensus with unreliable communications—technologies which subsequently have 
been developed and applied in modern permissioned systems. Chaum’s dissertation does not 
include the ideas of proof-of-work, dynamic throttling of work difficulty, and explicit smart 
contracts (though Chaum’s vaults support arbitrary distributed private computation).  
 
Unlike in most blockchain systems, nodes in Chaum’s system hold secret values, which 
necessitates a more complex mechanism for “restarting” after failures. Using what Chaum calls 
partial keys, any vault can back up its state securely by encrypting it with a key and then 
escrowing this key using what we now call threshold secret-sharing. After reading Chaum’s 
February 1979 technical report [Cha79] that describes partial keys, in November 1979, Adi 
Shamir [Sha79] published an elegant alternate method for secret sharing.  
 
Chaum also notes that pseudonyms can play an important role in effecting anonymity: “Another 
use allows an individual to correspond with a record keeping organization under a unique 
pseudonym which appears in a roster of acceptable clients.” [Cha82, p. 12]. 
 
To enable private transactions for blockchains, engineers are exploring the application of trusted 
execution environments (e.g., [CZK18], [BCK18]), continuing an approach fundamental in 
Chaum’s vaults. 
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In 1994, Szabo [Sza94] coined the term “smart contract,” but the idea of systematically applying 
rules to execute the terms of an agreement has a long history in trading systems. For example, 
in 1949, with a system involving ticker tapes and humans applying rules, Future, Inc., generated 
buy and sell orders for commodities [Aut14].  
 
Recently, so-called hybrid blockchains have emerged, which combine Byzantine fault-tolerant 
state machine replication with defenses against Sybil attacks---for example, PeerCensus, 
ByzCoin, Solidus, Hybrid Consensus, Elastico, OmniLedger, and RapidChain. Also, 
Hyperledger (an umbrella project involving Fabric, a system for permissioned blockchains) and 
Ethereum (a platform for public blockchains) have joined forces [Sta18]. 
 
Recently, researchers have applied game theory to model and analyze the behaviors of players 
and mining pools in blockchain-based digital currencies (e.g., see Dhamal [DCB18] and 
Lewenberg [LBS15]). 
 
Table 1 chronicles some of the important cryptographic discoveries underlying Blockchain 
technologies. For example, in 2018, the European Patent Office issued the first patent on 
Blockchain—a method for enforcing smart contracts [WrS18]. 
 
Table 1: Timeline of selected discoveries in cryptography and blockchain technology. 
 
1970    James Ellis, public-key cryptography discovered at GCHQ in secret 
1973    Clifford Cocks, RSA cryptosystem discovered at GCHQ in secret 
1974    Ralph Merkle, cryptographic puzzles (paper published in 1978) 
1976 Diffie and Hellman, public-key cryptography discovered at Stanford 
1977    Rivest, Shamir, Adleman, RSA cryptosystem invented at MIT 
1979    David Chaum, vaults and secret sharing (dissertation 1982) 
1982 Lamport, Shostak, Pease, Byzantine Generals Problem 
1992    Dwork and Naor, combating junk mail 
2002    Adam Bach, Hashcash 
2008    Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin 
2017    Wright and Savanah, nChain European patent application (issued in 2018) 
4.   Comparison of Selected Blockchain Systems 
To illustrate how the elements come together in actual blockchain systems, we compare a few 
selected systems, including Chaum’s vaults, Bitcoin, Dash [DuD14], Corda [BCG16, Cor], and 
Hyperledger Fabric [Lin15, LiL17a, Lin18], chosen for diversity. Table 2 describes how each of 
these systems carries out the four crucial participant roles of any blockchain defined below. For 
more context, Table 3 characterizes a few important properties of these systems and of one 
additional system—Ethereum [Eth14, Woo17]. 
  
In his vault system, Chaum [Cha82] identifies four crucial participant roles of any blockchain, 
which we denote Watchers, Doers, Executives, and Czars. The Watchers passively observe 
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and check the state of the ledger. The Doers (Level 1 Trustees) carry out actions, including 
serving state.  The Executives (Level 2 Trustees) sign (or otherwise attest to) the blocks. The 
Czars (Level 3 Trustees) change the executives and their policies. Chaum refers to these 
participants as “bodies” [Cha82, p. 30], leaving it unclear whether they could be algorithms. 
  
Although most systems do not explicitly specify these roles, all systems embody them, though 
with varying nuances. For example, many people naively think of Bitcoin as a fully distributed 
system free of any centralized control, but in fact Bitcoin’s core developers—as is true for all 
distributed systems—carry out the role of Czars, changing the underlying software that 
implements policy. Despite these significant powers, the control structure is still more distributed 
(anyone can potentially become a core developer) than for a permissioned system entirely 
controlled by a pre-specified entity. In Bitcoin, in each round, the winning miner (a Doer) 
becomes an Executive for that round. It is instructive to understand how each blockchain 
system allocates the four participant roles. 
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Table 2: Alignment of participant roles across five blockchain systems.  
 
Role 
  
  
Chaum 
1982 
A flexible 
system 
based on 
“vaults” 
Bitcoin 2008 
A 
permissionless 
system using 
proof-of-work 
Dash 2014 
Speeds up 
Bitcoin with 
a Master 
Node 
Network 
Corda 2016 
A 
permissioned 
system with 
smart 
contracts 
Hyperledger 
Fabric 2016 
A 
permissioned 
system with 
smart 
contracts 
Watchers 
Passively 
check state 
Any 
computer 
online 
[Cha82, p. 
51] 
“Nodes” 
(distinct from 
“full nodes”) 
Any 
computer 
online 
Nodes Peers 
Doers 
Carry out 
actions 
including 
serving state 
Level 1 
Trustee 
“Full nodes” Miners Nodes Peers 
Executives 
Sign blocks 
(or 
otherwise 
attest to 
them) 
Level 2 
Trustee 
(promoted 
from Level 1 
by Czars) 
[Cha82, p. 
39] 
Winning miner 
(promoted from 
Doers each 
round) 
Winning 
Master 
Node 
(promoted 
by an 
algorithm 
from the 
Master 
Node 
Network, 
which 
anyone may 
join for 1000 
Dash) 
Nodes (each 
node is an 
executive for 
its Corda 
blocks - called 
“states”) 
Endorsing 
peers 
Czars 
Change 
executives 
and their 
policies 
Level 3 
Trustee 
[Cha82, p. 
30] 
Core 
developers 
[YMR18] 
Quorum of 
Master 
Nodes 
Permissioning 
service 
  
Endorsement 
policies 
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Table 3 illustrates some of the possible variations of blockchains, including varying control and 
consensus policies, and different types of smart contracts. Whereas most blockchain systems 
maintain a single chain, Corda supports multiple independent chains, per node and/or among 
subsets of nodes. Similarly, Chaum’s system also supports multiple chains. While most 
blockchains require each node to maintain the same state, Corda and Chaum’s system do not.  
 
 
Table 3: Three properties of several distributed ledger systems. 
 
System Permissioned? Basis of 
consensus 
Smart contracts 
Chaum 
1982 
permissioned, with 
option for publicly 
permissioned 
weak consensus; does 
not handle concurrent 
client requests 
private arbitrary 
distributed computation 
Bitcoin 
2008 
permissionless proof-of-work conditional payment 
and limited smart 
contracts through 
scripts 
Dash 
2014 
combination proof-of-stake no 
Ethereum 
2014 
permissionless proof-of-work yes, non-private Turing 
complete objects 
Hyperledger 
Fabric 
2015 
permissioned based on state machine 
replication 
yes, off-chain 
Corda 
2016 
permissioned based on state machine 
replication 
yes (set of functions), 
including explicit links 
to human language 
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5.   Conflicts and Challenges 
Because blockchain technologies address enduring needs for permanent, indelible, trusted 
ledgers, they will likely be around in various forms for a long time. There are, however, some 
troubling fundamental conflicts that have not been solved. These conflicts include tensions 
between the following pairs of potentially dissonant concerns: privacy and indelibility, anonymity 
and accountability, stability and alternative future continuations, and current engineering choices 
and long-term security.  
 
For example, recent European privacy laws grant individuals the right to demand that their 
personal data be erased from most repositories (“right to be forgotten”) [GDP16, Article 17]. 
Satisfying this erasure requirement is highly problematic for indelible blockchains, especially for 
ones whose nodes lack physical security. 
 
An attraction of blockchains is its promise of stability enforced through consensus, yet 
sometimes the nodes cannot agree resulting in a "fork" and associated possible splits in the 
continuations of the chain. In a hard fork, Level 3 trustees issue a significant change in the rules 
that is incompatible with the old rules. In a soft fork, there is a less severe change in the rules 
for which the old system recognizes as valid blocks created by the new system (but not 
necessarily vice-versa) [LiL17]. 
 
Security engineers must commit to particular security parameters, hash functions, and digital 
signatures methods. No such choice can remain computationally secure forever in face of 
evolving computer technology, including quantum computers and other technologies not yet 
invented. The hopeful permanence of blockchains is dissonant with limited-time security of 
today’s engineering choices. 
 
Additional challenges facing blockchains include the huge amounts of energy spent on 
blockchain computations (especially PoW), the high rates at which ledgers grow, and the 
associated increases in transaction latency and processing time (Bitcoin's ledger is currently 
over 184 gigabytes [Sta18a]). 
 
As of September 2018, the hash rate for Bitcoin exceeded 50 million terahashes per second 
[Blo18], consuming more than 73 terawatt hours (TWh) of power per day, more than the amount 
consumed by Switzerland [Dig18]. These hashes were attempts to solve cryptographic puzzles 
of no intrinsic value (finding an input that when hashed produces a certain number of leading 
zeroes), and almost all of these computations went unused. Attempts, such as Primecoin 
[Kin13] and others [BRS17]), to replace cryptographic hash puzzles with useful work (e.g., 
finding certain types of prime integers) are challenging because it is very hard to find useful 
problems that have assured difficulty and whose level of difficulty can be dynamically throttled.  
Some researchers are exploring alternatives to PoW, such as proof of space [ABF14], proof of 
stake [KiN12], and proof of elapsed time [Hyp18]. 
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6.   Conclusion 
 
To understand blockchain systems, it is helpful to view them in terms of how the Watchers, 
Doers, Executives, and Czars carry out their functions under the guidance of the access, 
control, and consensus policies. This systematic abstract view helps focus attention on crucial 
elements and facilitates a balanced comparison of systems. 
 
Blockchains address many longstanding inherent needs for indelible ledgers, from financial 
transactions to property records and supply chains. With powerful existing enabling 
cryptographic techniques, a wide set of available variations, and a large amount of resources 
allocated to these technologies, blockchains hold significant potential. 
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